

The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict

by PASCHALIS M. KITROMILIDES

Ethnic conflicts have been approached in scholarly literature as the outgrowth of social mobilization and political change that disrupt traditional equilibria in ethnically segmented societies. The role of ideological factors in this process has generally been overlooked by social scientists who tend to emphasize structural variables in their interpretations. Yet systems of ideas play decisive roles in the emergence and escalation of confrontations by mediating the opposing groups' self-conception and by providing the vocabulary and arguments through which differentiation and conflict are articulated.¹ The sources and stakes in ethnic confrontation are often of highly symbolic significance, and this lends critical importance to the ideological dimension both for purposes of understanding and resolving the conflict. This essay attempts to illustrate the role of ideological elements in ethnic conflicts through an investigation of the development and eventual collision of two opposing nationalist movements in the case of the binational society of Cyprus.

I. *The Ideological Nature of Greek Irredentism*

Nationalism as a problem in political analysis has been greatly misunderstood. Scholarly interpretations have often failed to treat it as a phenomenon meaningful in concrete historical contexts. On the contrary, political experiences mostly dating from the period between the World Wars have been allowed to color its past and obscure its origins.² By mis-

¹ Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 36-39. Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1973, recognizes the importance of ideological factors. The discussion of ideology in this paper draws broadly on Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1964, pp. 47-76.

² One of the best studies of the character of nationalism has been motivated by the desire to understand its relation to the crises and disasters of the twentieth century: *Nationalism—A report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, London, Oxford University Press, 1939. The undertaking was described as an effort to understand a phenomenon appearing "to threaten the very future of civilization" (p. xiv).

construing its nature, it became customary to think of nationalism as a static and immutable phenomenon, inexorably tied to the ideological apparatus of the political right. Due to this ahistorical view, observers have failed to perceive nationalism in the context of social change and have therefore misunderstood its significance as an ideology and as a social movement in different historical periods.

Modern national sentiment developed out of the cosmopolitan and humanist culture of the Enlightenment.³ In dispelling the mythology of traditional values, the Enlightenment cleared the way for the idea of the nation to inspire a new political culture based on concepts of egalitarianism and human rights. In this context, the notion of the nation stressing the sense of common intimate bonds among its members, and resting on a conception of a shared and distinctive cultural heritage, provided the ideological content for the popular mobilizations which in a greater or smaller scale spread throughout Europe in the age of the French Revolution.⁴

Neohellenic nationalism was the eventual product of the gradual opening up of the culture of Ottoman Greece to European intellectual and political influences in the course of the eighteenth century.⁵ The transmission of the ideas of the Enlightenment into modern Greek thought was decisive for the awakening of the national consciousness of modern Greeks.⁶ At a time when a "true cosmopolite and a most loyal

³ Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 19-22. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York, Collier, 1967 and Johan Huizinga, *Men and Ideas*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959, pp. 97-155 are germane to the study of nationalist thinking.

⁴ On the breakdown of the traditional mystique of kingship at the time of the French Revolution see Michael Walzer, *Regicide and Revolution*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974, especially pp. 86-89. For a useful survey of basic bibliography on the several currents of European nationalism see Anthony D. Smith, "Nationalism, A trend Report and Bibliography," *Current Sociology*, Vol. xxi, No. 3, 1973, pp. 143-150.

⁵ The subject is complex and bibliography, mostly in Greek, on its various aspects is voluminous. For a very good English language introduction to the problem in a comparative Balkan context, see L. S. Stavrianos, "Antecedents to the Balkan Revolutions of the 19th Century," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 29, 1957, pp. 333-48. Traian Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant" *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1960, pp. 234-313 gives an excellent account of the socioeconomic background. G. P. Henderson, *The Revival of Greek Thought*, Albany, SUNY Press, 1970, offers a general survey of the most important intellectual figures in this process.

⁶ Cf. Raphael Demos "The Neo-hellenic Enlightenment, 1750-1820" *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 19, 1958, pp. 523-41 and Philip Sherrard, *The Greek East and the Latin West*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 165-195. By far the most important contributions to the subject are the several works of K. Th. Dimaras. See for an overview, his *Ιστορία της Νεοελληνικής Λογοτεχνίας* [History of the Modern Greek Literature] 6th ed., Athens, Ikaros, 1975, pp.

patriot”⁷ were essentially identical, it is not surprising that the national awakening of modern Greeks was the work of a group of cosmopolitan Greek intellectuals. These men, infused with the culture of the Enlightenment, belonged sociologically to the cosmopolitan European intelligentsia of the eighteenth century and the revolutionary period. The main thrust of their effort was directed at projecting the achievements of European civilization as the models toward which Greek culture and society should strive. This outlook was already exemplified in the 1760s by Iossipos Moisioudax, one of the sharpest minds of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, who had the courage to emphasize, in the face of deeply entrenched prejudices, that

Truth should be preferred even though it occasionally pinches. Contemporary Europe, partly due to proper administration and partly due to the cultural concern of local rulers, surpasses today in wisdom even Ancient Greece.

The conclusion was therefore inescapable that

Greece does need Europe; because at the present time the one is bursting with, while the other is totally deprived of, the most remarkable lights of learning.⁸

But there is no doubt at the same time that the adoption of European modes of thought and behavior was judged desirable fundamentally because it was seen as the safest avenue to the cultural revival of the Greek nation. Moisioudax and the men who followed him were unequivocal about this.⁹

It is characteristic of the interplay of national and cosmopolitan values that influenced the Greek revival that one of the first times that the word “cosmopolitan” was used in modern Greek was in the pen-name of an English Philhellene who addressed a letter to the Greek literary journal, *Logios Ermis*. The letter extolled the achievements of contemporary Greek culture in the direction of the Enlightenment and called for an intensification of such efforts as a sure way to bring about Greece’s revival. The correspondent who described Greece as his second fatherland

130-175. A translation of the work in English was published by SUNY Press, 1972. See also *idem*, *La Grèce au temps des Lumières*, Geneva, Droz, 1964, pp. 103-132. Stephen G. Xydis, “Modern Greek Nationalism” in Peter Sugar and Ivo Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 207-232, focuses on the political dimension.

⁷ Franco Venturi, *Italy and the Enlightenment, Studies in a Cosmopolitan Century*, New York, N.Y.U. Press, 1972, p. xix. The phrase is quoted from a 1775 letter of Pietro Verri, the Italian economist and reformer.

⁸ Iossepox Moisioudax, *Ἡθικὴ Φιλοσοφία* (a translation of Antonio Muratori, *Filosofia Morale*), Venice, 1761, Vol. I, Prolegomena, pp. xx-xxi.

⁹ I. Moisioudax, *Ἀπολογία* [Apology], Vienna, 1780, pp. 128-131.

chose to sign his letter with the pseudonym, Philanthropidis Kosmopolitis, Humanity-Loving Cosmopolite.¹⁰

The publication of the journal, *Logios Ermis*, itself in the decade 1811-1821 can be seen as the high point of the influence of the cosmopolitan ideas of the Enlightenment on the formation of modern Greek national consciousness. The journal's avowed objective was to expose the awakened minds of modern Greeks to contemporary European science, philosophy, and culture. The effect of this was explicitly expected to be the promotion of Greek culture and learning, a better acquaintance with the heritage of classical Greece, and, as a consequence of this, the emergence of a self-aware and alert Neohellenic national consciousness.¹¹

It was under the impact of such cultural influences that modern Greek nationalism was born. As expressed in the writings of its two foremost exponents, Rhigas Velestinlis and Adamantios Korais, modern Greek nationalism was a democratic force, sharing the most radical aspirations of contemporary European political thought. Rhigas was an activist who actualized the unity of revolutionary theory and praxis in his plans for the Greek-led liberation of the Balkan peoples from the yoke of the Ottomans. This was to be based on a declaration of fundamental rights and a social contract informed by the most forward-looking aspirations of the French Revolution.¹² Korais, who put a premium on the classical Greek value of moderation, was no less radical in his vision of a new Greece. He expected the Greek revival to be achieved through the effects of education that would cultivate the republican ethic of public spiritedness in the citizens of Greece. The social effects of this ethical revolution would essentially amount to a radical reshaping of the traditional society of Ottoman Greece into a moral republic dedicated to the spirit of Greek classicism and the European Enlightenment.¹³

¹⁰ Δόγτος Ἐρμῆς [The Learned Mercury], 15 July 1918, pp. 601-606. The Cosmopolite and his views were attacked by a correspondent of the conservative journal of the period *Καλλιόπη* [Kalliope]. The correspondent who used the pseudonym Χριστουπολίτης (the Citizen of the Christian City), wrote that a Cosmopolite is a man who has no loyalty to any country. See *Καλλιόπη*, Vol. I, No. 17, 1 September 1819, pp. 161-66. It is interesting to observe that it was the Christian Citizen's view of cosmopolitanism that was eventually ingrained in the dominant Modern Greek ideology.

¹¹ Cf. Catherine Coumariou, "Cosmopolitisme et Hellénisme dans le 'Mercure Savant,' première revue grecque, 1811-1821," *Proceedings of the IV Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association* (Fribourg, 1964), The Hague and Paris, Mouton, 1966, pp. 601-608.

¹² Cf. R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964, Vol. II, pp. 173-174, 334-35 and L. S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation*, Northampton, Smith College Studies in History, 1944, pp. 34-36, 44. For Rhigas' writings see Πήγας, Athens, 1953 (*Βασιλική Βιβλιοθήκη*, Vol. 10), with an important introduction by L. I. Vranousis, pp. 7-112.

¹³ See generally Stephen G. Chaconas, *Adamantios Korais, A Study in Greek Nationalism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1942. See also Kohn, *The*

Yet it was not ideological orientations of this sort that were eventually decisive in the formation of Greek nationalism. To grasp its ideological character one has to follow the transformations undergone by the liberal nationalism of the Neohellenic Enlightenment in the decades immediately following the Greek Revolution and the formation of an independent Greek state.

In the last few years before 1821, Greek liberalism was already under a severe assault by entrenched conservative social forces led by the Church. Just before the Revolution, some of the major centers of the culture of the Enlightenment and political liberalism, such as the schools of Jannena and Smyrna,¹⁴ were falling into decay. When the Revolution broke out, the Greek Enlightenment was on the wane, while the forces of conservatism, rallied around the Patriarchate of Constantinople, were finally winning the ideological and political battle that had polarized the Greek elites since the 1790s.¹⁵ In the ideological and social cleavages that unfolded throughout the revolutionary decade,¹⁶ one can witness the liberal aspiration so bravely voiced in the first constitutional charter voted at Epidaurus on January 1, 1822, gradually undermined and provisionally abandoned with the election in 1827 of Ioannes Capodistrias as the first Governor of independent Greece. This election, which went along with the delegation of dictatorial powers to Capodistrias, was a clear sign that a non-liberal option was gaining ground as a solution to the Greek problem.¹⁷ The final forfeiture of the aspirations of the liberal nationalism

Idea of Nationalism, pp. 534-542 and Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, New York Meridian, 1970, pp. 37-48 and especially pp. 153-188 which gives an English version of Korais' famous "Memoire sur l' état actuel de la civilization en Grèce." See also Dimaras, *Ἱστορία . . .*, pp. 193-213 and 556-562 for bibliographical indications.

¹⁴ See briefly Christos Solomonides, *Ἡ Παιδεία στὴ Σμύρνη* [Education in Smyrna], Athens, 1961, pp. 41-78; Phanes Michalopoulos, *Τὰ Γιάννενα καὶ ἡ Νεοελληνικὴ Ἀναγέννηση, 1648-1820* [Yannina and the Neohellenic Revival, 1648-1820], Athens, 1930, pp. 59-81.

¹⁵ See generally Richard Clogg, "Aspects of the Movement for Greek Independence" in Clogg, ed., *The Struggle for Greek Independence*, London, Macmillan, 1973, pp. 1-40, and D. Zakythenos, *Ἡ Τουρκοκρατία* [The period of Turkish rule], Athens, 1957, pp. 77-92.

¹⁶ See John A. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 19-106. For an analysis on the constitutions of the Revolution, see Nicholas Kaltchas, *Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1965, pp. 34-57.

¹⁷ When the Third National Assembly convened in 1827 the political climate was such that the aspiration for a system of liberal institutions was abandoned. With the *Πολιτικὸν Σύνταγμα τῆς Ἑλλάδος* [Political Charter of Greece] which was voted in May 1827, the Assembly set the constitutional context for the rule of Kapodistrias. See *Ἀρχεῖα τῆς Ἐθνικῆς Παλιγγενεσίας, 1821-1832* [Archives of National Regeneration, 1821-1832], Vol. 3, 1971, pp. 659-662. The next (fourth) National Assembly in 1829 voted no new constitution but it only passed

that agitated the Greek Enlightenment came with the acceptance of an absolute monarchy to rule over the new Greek state.¹⁸ The monarchical option was expected to secure great power support for the Greek cause; but it also suited the needs of a realignment of conservative interests in Greek society. In short, the eventual outcome of the Greek Revolutionary War was very different from the visions harbored by the men of the Enlightenment and even from the aspirations of the revolutionary leaders who drew up the first Greek constitutional charters.

The reasons for the failure of the Enlightenment to take root in Greek society and to develop into a liberal political culture are complex and far from easy to point out. An examination of this difficult problem will have to consider the type of economic development experienced by the Greek lands in the eighteenth century, its impact on the Greek social structure, the relative distribution of power among various social groups in Ottoman Greece, the social bases of Enlightenment culture, and, finally, social conflicts during the Greek Revolution and the entanglement of the powers of Restoration Europe in the outcome of the War of Independence. It is obvious that this analysis cannot be attempted here. The reader of the following pages should be aware, nevertheless, of these structural preconditions of the ideological movements discussed below.

The most dramatic indication of the eventual failure of the Enlightenment¹⁹ can be traced on a personal level by following the later stages in the careers of those of its original adherents who survived the Greek Revolution. Men like Neophytos Vamvas, the most favored of Korais's younger followers, and Constantine Oikonomos, who, in the 1810s, was in the vanguard of the struggle for progressive education at Smyrna, eventually became spokesmen for monarchism and political and religious conservatism in the kingdom of Greece.²⁰ In contrast to them, Theophilos Kaires, a man who tried to remain faithful to his ideas of religious non-

several resolutions confirming Kapodistrias' actions. See *ibid.*, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 153-199. For analysis cf. Kaltchas, *Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece*, pp. 58-79.

¹⁸ This was done by the new constitution voted by the Fifth National Assembly in March 1832. The new charter established a monarchical form of government modeled on the French restoration. See 'Αρχαία τῆς Ἑθνικῆς Παλιγγενεσίας, Vol. 5, 1974, pp. 271-304. Cf. Kaltchas, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-95.

¹⁹ On the failure of the Enlightenment cf., briefly, Dimaras, 'Ο Κοραΐς καὶ ἡ ἐποχὴ του [Korais and his Age], Athens, 1953 (Βασικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη), Vol. 9. pp. 60-62 and Henderson, *The Revival of Greek Thought*, pp. 199-207.

²⁰ See K. Th. Dimaras, Δύο Φίλοι, Κοραΐς καὶ Βάμβας [Two friends, Korais and Vamvas], Athens, 1953, especially pp. 52-54. On educational conflicts in Smyrna there is a remarkable account by one of the participants, Konstantinos Koumas, Ἱστορία τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πράξεων [Histories of Human Actions], Vol. XII, Vienna, 1832, pp. 582-91, 598-99. For Oikonomos' turn to conservatism see briefly Dimaras, Ἱστορία . . . , p. 267 and Petropulos, *Politics and Statecraft*, pp. 294-95. For a characteristic case study of the conservatism of Greek thought following the decade of the Revolution see K. Lappas, "Ο Καλα-

conformism and freedom of speech and conscience, was persecuted in independent Greece, and finally died in jail. Kaires's fate was a test case that proved the weakness of Greek liberalism in the mid-nineteenth century.²¹

It was during this period, however, that a new militant nationalist ideology was in the making in Greece. The cultural and intellectual climate within which this new nationalism was shaped was very different from the climate that produced the liberal nationalism of the Enlightenment. A period of religious revival began in Greece in the 1830s with the formation of the Philorthodox Society,²² culminating in a surge of religious fundamentalism and millenarianism in the 1850s.²³ The signs of a resurgence of religious conservatism were multiple: restoration of relations between the independent Church of Greece and its mother Church, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, in the name of Pan-Orthodox unity; official recognition of the Church as the guardian of spiritual and national unity; stepping up of persecution of religious critics such as Kaires, Lascaratou, Synodinos.²⁴

The preoccupation with the safeguard of the unity and genuineness of Orthodoxy was just the most ideologically charged symptom of a militant conservatism that rallied its forces in this period. The safeguard and strengthening of Orthodoxy was an integral part of its aspirations, but the heart of the matter went much deeper to the basic cultural conflict in Greek society between Western influences and entrenched Eastern patterns of thought and action.²⁵ In the 1830s and 1840s, conservatism rallied its forces against the survivals of the Enlightenment which could still command some influence in the problem of the Church. (Significantly, there were profound disagreements between the two camps even on the

βρυτινός Δάσκαλος Γρηγόριος Ίωαννίδης και ή βιβλιοθήκη του" [The teacher from Kalavryta Gregorios Ioannides and his library], Μνήμων, Vol. V, Athens, 1976, pp. 157-200.

²¹ Cf. Aik. Coumariou, "Η ελευθεροφροσύνη του Θεοφίλου Καίρη," Έποχές, No. 46, February 1967, pp. 184-200. On Kairis' philosophical views, see Peter Thetis, trans. and ed., *Philosophics of Theophilos Kairis, Greece's New Socrates*, New York, Pageant Press, 1960.

²² See Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft*, pp. 329-43, 519-33 and Barbara Jelavich, "The Philorthodox Conspiracy of 1839," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. III, 1966, pp. 89-102.

²³ K. Th. Dimaras, ed., *Κωνσταντίνου Παπαρρηγοπούλου Προλεγόμενα* [K. Paparregopoulos' Prolegomena], Athens, Ermes, 1970, pp. 10-12.

²⁴ For the recognition of the Church as the guardian of national unity *ibid*, p. 11. It came in a parliamentary bill regulating the affairs of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece in 1852. For the climate of religious revival in this period see also K. Th. Dimaras, *Νεοελληνικός Διαφωτισμός* [Neohellenic Enlightenment], Athens, Ermes, 1977, pp. 403-404. On the religious history of the period generally, see Charles A. Frazee, *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852*, Cambridge, Cambridge, University Press, 1969.

²⁵ See generally Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft*, pp. 37-42.

conception and implementation of Greek irredentism. By the 1850s, conservatism won the day and stamped the subsequent political and ideological development of Greece.)

At the same time, a new philosophical outlook made its appearance, beginning from a fundamental criticism and refutation of the eighteenth century philosophy of liberal individualism. This was done in an *Essay on the Philosophy of History* published by Markos Renieris in 1841.²⁶ Writing under the influence of the rediscovery of Vico in the age of romanticism,²⁷ Renieris stressed that the liberal individualism of eighteenth century philosophy was only a very partial truth inferior to the wisdom of social collectivities such as the people, the *Volk*, whom he considered as the repository of true values and true knowledge.²⁸ The full negation of the philosophy of the Enlightenment came with the affirmation of the final truth of the Christian religion. In the doctrine of the Trinity, the antagonism between ego and non-ego was resolved, and true unity, the fundamental spiritual requirement of the age following the collapse of individualism, was achieved.²⁹ The triumph of the new philosophy had special implications for Greece: once it had discovered the meaning of the true philosophy and had solved its own philosophical problems, Greece was destined to solve the philosophical problem of the East—and with the philosophical one, its political problem as well.³⁰ So the new philosophical outlook taking root in Greece in the mid-nineteenth century came full circle to connect the negation of Enlightenment with the political aspirations of Greece in the Near East.

By following the vicissitudes of Neohellenic thought, we are directly approaching the final formulation of the ideology of Greek irredentism in the crucial decade of the 1840s. A final dimension of the intellectual climate directly bearing on the elaboration of this ideology points to the historiography of the period. Stimulated by the reaction to Fallmerayer's theories, Greek historical scholarship rallied its forces in order to refute his racist claims concerning the descent of modern Greeks from the Slavic and Albanian tribes that penetrated the Byzantine Empire. In response to this provocation, Greek scholars elaborated the historical doctrine of the ethnological and cultural continuity of the Greek nation and Greek civilization. This doctrine found its most mature and convincing formulation in the monumental five-volume *History of the Greek Nation* written by Constantine Papanregopoulos. He began his researches with a monograph published in 1844 under the title of *The Last Year of Greek Freedom*.³¹

²⁶ Markos Renieris, *Δοκίμιον Φιλοσοφίας τῆς Ἱστορίας* [Essay on the Philosophy of History], Athens, 1841.

²⁷ Cf. K. Th. Dimaras, "L'heure de Vico pour la Grèce" in *La Grèce au temps des Lumières*, pp. 133-152.

²⁸ Renieris, *Δοκίμιον Φιλοσοφίας τῆς Ἱστορίας*, pp. 38-92.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 159-167.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. xii-xiii.

³¹ Konstantinos Papanregopoulos, *Τὸ τελευταῖον ἔτος τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐλευ-*

It dealt with Greece's fall to the Romans in 146 B.C. In trying to capture the meaning of Greek history, Papparegopoulos noted, one had to follow the processes leading from discord and division to unity.³² The climax of division at the end of the ancient era had brought about the loss of freedom and the subjugation to the Romans. Since then, however, several processes of unification had set in, reaching their maturity in the author's time:

Polytheism has been replaced by the unity of Christianity; the variety of dialects by the unity of language; the different tribes by the unity of the nation. Fortified in this three-dimensional panoply, the Greek people is struggling to recover its political unity.³³

One may wonder as to what was the position reserved for the heritage of classical Greece in the new outlook. Renieris interpreted classical Greek civilization as a struggle between the ego and the collectivity, culminating in the triumph of ego, which he saw achieved in Platonic thought.³⁴ Despite this eventual triumph of the ego, he did not discount classical civilization, which, after all, provided Greece's major claim to glory and was, therefore, necessary in creating the symbolism of Greek identity and dignity. Precisely for the same reasons, the major pre-occupation of Greek historicism was to connect the modern Greeks ethnologically and culturally directly to the ancient (in this, romantic historicism shared one of the basic tenets of the Greek Enlightenment). Even revived Orthodox consciousness did not go all the way to reject wholesale pagan classicism: the concept of a "Greco-Christian" civilization was elaborated instead by some of its spokesmen.³⁵ They tried to integrate a moralistic understanding of classical ethics and philosophy into a framework of Christian thought by pointing to the classical learning of the major Church Fathers as a precedent. What changed fundamentally was the understanding, the meaning accorded to the classics. The republican reading of the classics, as conceived by Koraeis, was abandoned and replaced by a purely rhetorical celebration of ancient Greek greatness. The significance of the change lay in the fact that the potentialities of social criticism inherent in the classicism of the Enlightenment (of which Koraeis's synthesis was typical) were displaced by the ideology of ancestral worship that sustained the modern Greek claim to glory. One consequence of this was that social criticism as a form of consciousness was almost ex-

θεπτας [The last year of Greek Freedom], Athens, 1844. The first edition of *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους* [History of the Greek Nation], Vols. I-V, came out in Athens, 1860-1874.

³² K. Papparegopoulos, *Τελευταῖον ἔτος*, pp. 3-4.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁴ Renieris, *Δοκίμιον*, pp. 112-158.

³⁵ For the coining of the term see Dimaras, *La Grèce au temps des Lumières*, p. 16.

cluded from the modern Greek intellectual universe and was replaced by an intolerant sense of self-sufficiency and self-confidence based on the argument of continuity between the classical past and Neohellenic present.

Thus, the theme of unity, on which all intellectual strands of the period seemed to converge, emerged as a product of the philosophical critique and negation of liberalism and as the battle-cry of religious militancy that accompanied a conservative realignment. With the scholarly researches of Greek national historicism, it was given a "scientific" basis to sustain its claims. The cultural climate was thus ripe for a translation of these converging intellectual orientations into a political program. This political articulation came in the form of the ideology of the Great Idea that was to inspire Greek irredentism from then onward.³⁶ In the same year that saw the publication of Pappargopoulos's first monograph, Ioannes Kolettis, in an address to the National Assembly drafting the Greek constitution, voiced the new political aspirations and described his vision of Greece's mission in the world:

By her geographical location, Greece is the center of Europe; with the East on her right and the West on her left, she has been destined through her downfall to enlighten the West and through her regeneration to enlighten the East. The first task has been fulfilled by our ancestors; the second is assigned to us. In the spirit of our oath and of this great idea, I have seen the delegates of the nation assembling to deliberate not simply on the fate of Greece, but of the entire Greek race . . . [W]e have been led astray and away from that great idea of the fatherland which was first expressed in the song of Rhigas. At that time all of us who bore the Greek name, united in one spirit, realized a part of the whole goal. . . .

Each of us has in himself a sense of his splendid Greek origin. Each of us is aware that this Assembly is convening in Athens, whose splendor, grandeur and inimitable achievements have been admired throughout the centuries. Athens, and the rest of Greece divided in the past in particular states, fell and through her downfall she has enlightened the world. Contemporary Greece, united as she is in one state, one purpose, one power, one religion, should therefore inspire great expectations in the world. . . .³⁷

³⁶ See *inter alia*, I. K. Voyitizides, "'Η Μεγάλη 'Ιδέα'" [The Great Idea], 'Η πεντακοσιοστή επέτειος από της 'Αλώσεως της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, 1453-1953 [The Five-hundredth anniversary of the fall of Constantinople, 1453-1953], Athens, 1953, pp. 305-314; D. Zakythenos, 'Η Πολιτική Ιστορία της Νεωτέρας 'Ελλάδος [The Political History of Modern Greece], Athens, 1965, pp. 47-56; K. Th. Dimaras, "'Τῆς Μεγάλης ταύτης 'Ιδέας'" [Of this Great Idea], Athens, 1970.

³⁷ 'Η τῆς τρίτης Σεπτεμβρίου ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἐθνική Συνέλευσις. Πρακτικά

Greece's unity of power and purpose, and its civilizing mission in the East, were, of course, to be accomplished at the expense of the traditional rival, the Ottoman Empire. The rise of the great empire of the Ottoman Turks since the fourteenth century had been associated with the decline and retreat of Hellenism in the East: Asia Minor, the Balkans, Constantinople—the cherished queen of all cities—the Greek heartlands, finally fell one after another to the Turkish onslaught. This created a long tradition of anguish and resentment reflected in folklore and late Byzantine and post-Byzantine political thought.³⁸ Along with it went a millenarian faith in the eventual resurrection of the Empire and the re-birth of Hellenism and Greek glory. This belief shaped most of Greek political thinking during the *Tourkokratia*. The attitude was strengthened in the eighteenth century under the impact of the Enlightenment view of the barbarian and decadent Turk who brought destruction to civilization wherever he encountered it. This outlook was espoused full-heartedly by the Greek exponents of the Enlightenment in whose thought the revival of classical Greek ideals and learning, in the context of modern Greek civilization, became contingent on the overthrow and disappearance of the decivilizing presence of the Turks.³⁹ This conception of the Greek problem became the most powerful strand in Neohellenic nationalist thinking; it lived through the Enlightenment and the Revolution and became the cardinal belief of the Great Idea. It was probably the only one of the themes of Enlightenment thought that was not questioned by the exponents of the Great Idea. In the new framework, traditional anti-Turkish symbolism, reinforced by the experiences of fighting an all-out War of Independence against the Turks, was linked with a precise political program which visualized the replacement of the Ottoman Empire by a Greek state in the East led by the Greek crown. The small kingdom was to lead the struggle for the liberation of unredeemed Greeks and the recovery of historic Greek territories in pursuit of Panhellenic unity. All the resources and energy of the Greek kingdom were to be mobilized to this end and all diplomatic opportunities to be seized to promote it.

[Proceedings of the National Assembly of Third September in Athens], Athens, 1844. Quoted paragraphs occur on pp. 190-191 (my translation).

³⁸ Speros Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Century*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 408-438 and Anthony Bryer, *The Great Idea, History Today*, Vol. XV, No. 3 (March, 1965), pp. 159-168.

³⁹ On the Enlightenment's view of the decivilizing impact of Turkish dominion see most characteristically Montesquieu, *Persian Letters*, No. 19. On anti-Turkish hatred in the Greek Enlightenment see among many other examples the revolutionary pamphlets by Adamantios Korais, *Ἕσσμα Πολεμιστήριον* [War Song], 1800 and *Σάλπισμα Πολεμιστήριον* [War Trumpet-blast], 1801 as well as his *Ἀδελφικὴ Διδασκαλία* [Fraternal Instruction], 1798. Cf. Chaconas, *Adamantios Korais*, pp. 86-89. The same attitude animates the radical political treatise, *Ἑλληνικὴ Νομαρχία* [Hellenic Nomarchy], anonymously published in 1806. See pp. 127-149 of the 3rd edition, G. Valetas, ed., Athens, 1957.

Also, the unredeemed Greeks of the periphery were to be converted to the values of the Great Idea through education and the creation of a network of political and cultural ties with free Greece. In an age of romanticism, when the mystique of nationalism was swaying the whole of Europe, the appeal of this political program grew so powerful that dissent or criticism was simply regarded as betrayal of the most sacred values and cherished aspirations of the nation.

This ideology, born of the conservative reorientation of Greek thought, fundamentally fulfilled a social function that tended to consolidate the prevailing *status quo* in Greek society. By making external preoccupations the major priority of Greek politics, it distracted attention from domestic problems and provided an emotional way for diffusing social pressures from below on the conservative structures of Greek society.⁴⁰ By pointing to a common national goal beyond the narrow frontiers of the Greek kingdom, the ideology of the Great Idea deprived domestic social conflicts from legitimacy and left the conservative *status quo* unquestioned.

Several qualifications, distinctions, and *caveats* should be added here. First of all, it has to be noted that irredentism was by no means the only channel through which domestic social pressures were defused. Other mechanisms as well served the same purpose in the course of the nineteenth century: social mobility through effectively controlled patronage, or taking to the mountains and resorting to brigandage, offered alternative ways of alleviating the destitution of the lower, especially rural, social strata.⁴¹ Emigration to southern Russia, Egypt, and Asia Minor throughout the nineteenth century, increasingly moving to America toward the end of the century, provided the classic mechanism sustaining the conservative *status quo* by removing the demographic surpluses that could furnish the potential social bases of protest movements.

It must be noted, secondly, that, although acceptance of the Great Idea as an ultimate goal was general and remained an unquestioned precondition of political legitimacy, disagreements over specific objectives and tactics and over the precise territorial content of irredentism always remained points of controversy and contention in Greek domestic

⁴⁰ See Nikolaos Dragoumis, Ἱστορικαὶ Ἀναμνήσεις [Historical Recollections], 2nd ed., Athens, 1879, Vol. II, pp. 162-163. Cf. Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, New York, Holt, Rinehart, 1958, p. 468 and V. I. Philiass, *Κοινωνία καὶ Ἐξουσία στήν Ἑλλάδα* [Society and Authority in Greece], Athens, 1974, pp. 164-166 for a fuller elaboration of this point. For the economic consequences of irredentism see A. A. Pepelasis, "The Image of the Past and Economic Backwardness" *Human Organization*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter, 1958-59), pp. 19-27.

⁴¹ On the problem of brigandage in nineteenth century Greece see the excellent recent study by Yiannis Koliopoulos, *Ἀηστές* [Bandits], Athens, Ermes, 1979. One might also consult with profit Romilly Jenkins, *The Dilessi Murders*, London, Longmans, 1961, which though biased and lacking a sociological perspective, does provide many details and insights.

politics.⁴² All this tied in inextricably with other issues agitating Greek politics, such as constitutionalism and the role of the "protecting" powers, that constantly preoccupied the political class.

Thirdly, it is essential to be borne in mind that, whatever the stakes in and uses of irredentism by the political class, the aspirations of the Great Idea possessed independent appeal for the masses, especially for the demoralized lower social strata of the cities. The political culture of disappointed expectations⁴³ that took root in the Greek kingdom as the promises of the Revolution were finally dispelled by the entrenchment of Othonian authoritarianism, found an outlet in the political romanticism of irredentism.⁴⁴ At the same time, irredentism became the last resort of a new hope: the great national effort that was to lead to the liberation of the unredeemed might also foretell the amelioration of the lot of those living within the frontiers of independent Greece. The vision of national redemption for the unliberated brethren carried with it an inchoate promise of civil liberties and social progress for the free but disappointed Greek citizens.⁴⁵

Seen in this perspective, the politics of the Great Idea will be understood to spring from deep and very real needs of Greek society. The most tangible of these needs, of which everyone was acutely aware at the time, was the sense that the long-term economic and demographic viability of the Greek state was contingent upon substantial territorial changes that would make self-sustaining socioeconomic development possible. A final distinction should therefore be kept in mind when thinking of Greek irredentism. Although the Great Idea dominated Greek domestic politics and foreign policy throughout the period in which classical European imperialism was reaching its heyday, it should never be confused with it. Greece simply did not meet the historical presuppositions of imperialist expansion. Greek irredentism, therefore, despite all its contradictions, never ceased being a liberation movement. This will become adequately clear after an examination of the nature and meaning of Greek nationalism in the irredenta themselves.

The meaning of Greek irredentism was not identical inside and

⁴² See Dragoumis, 'Ιστορικαὶ Ἀναμνήσεις [Historical Recollections], p. 183. For a critique of Kolettis' irredentist program see Mavrocordatos' 1848 Memorandum published *ibid.*, pp. 165-183. Cf. G. N. Philaretos, *Ξενοκρατία καὶ Βασιλεία ἐν Ἑλλάδι, 1821-1897* [Foreign Domination and Monarchy in Greece, 1821-1897], Athens, 1897, pp. 93-96, 100, 169.

⁴³ K. Th. Dimaras, *Ἱστορία . . .*, p. 300.

⁴⁴ Kostis Moskov, *Ἡ ἔθνικὴ καὶ κοινωνικὴ συνείδηση στὴν Ἑλλάδα 1830-1909* [National and Social Consciousness in Greece 1830-1909], Thessalonike, 1972, pp. 108-109.

⁴⁵ Cf. the bitterness of Makrygiannis at the post-revolutionary political and social realities of the Greek kingdom and his involvement in irredentist projects. See Makrygiannis, *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], ed., by Sp. Asdrachas, Athens, Karavias, n.d., pp. 5-7, 14, 85, 335, 340-44, 359, 416-19, 420-21, 463-64, 480-84, 525.

outside Greece. For a nation which felt its greatest part to be under alien rule after the achievement of independence by a small fraction of its historic territories, irredentism was a natural and perfectly understandable preoccupation. Furthermore, if irredentist nationalism within Greece served conservative social functions, for the unredeemed Greek populations in Thessaly and Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace, Asia Minor and Pontos, the Ionian and Aegean Islands, Crete and Cyprus, it possessed a different meaning. For them, the dream of the Great Idea did not involve mere national aggrandizement, but carried the promise of their redemption from arbitrary and autocratic rule; far from representing the fantasies of political romanticism, nationalism for the unredeemed Greeks of the Ottoman Empire was a concrete aspiration for political order and material progress under the aegis of a national entity with which they could identify symbolically and culturally.

It was this meaning that provided the moral and psychological momentum of Greek irredentism. It was precisely this dimension of the ideology of the Great Idea that made it possible for Greek irredentism to penetrate so widely and to take such an effective hold among the populations of the unredeemed Greek periphery. In examining the experience of Cyprus as a case study of the transmission and development of Greek irredentist nationalism on the periphery of the Hellenic world, one should never lose sight of this crucial factor. This will take the student of Greek Cypriot nationalism a long way toward an adequate explanation of the strength, resilience, and tenacity of the *enosis* movement on the island.

II. *From the National Center to the Hellenic Periphery*

The origins of Greek nationalism in Cyprus can be traced to the initiatives toward an intellectual awakening undertaken in the period of the Neohellenic Enlightenment. Sporadic and inchoate initially, stifled by the odds of Ottoman rule and the natural calamities marking the history of Cyprus in the eighteenth century, they acquired more density in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. This cultural preparation, which opened a small segment of the society of Cyprus to influences emanating from the major centers of Hellenism, provided the substratum of Cyprus' responses to the Greek Revolution in the 1820s.⁴⁶ Whatever can be gleaned from these phenomena, however, cannot take us beyond the level of individual action. So it would be ahistorical to talk of any kind of nationalism before the last phase of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, which stretches from the end of the Greek War of Independence to 1878.

The last fifty years of Ottoman rule in Cyprus are enclosed by two

⁴⁶ See generally John Koumoulides, *Cyprus and the Greek War of Independence 1821-1829*, London, Zeno, 1974, and Loizos Philippou, *Κόπριοι Ἀγωνιστὰι* [Cypriot Fighters], Nicosia, 1953.

characteristic events in the development of Greek nationalism in that country. In 1828, the newly-elected Archbishop Panaretos and the prelates and lay notables of Cyprus appealed to Governor Ioannes Capodistrias, asking him to include Cyprus in the independent Greek state emerging from the War of Independence.⁴⁷ This appeal was a more concrete formulation of the aspiration for national liberation voiced in the declaration of December 6, 1821, signed in Marseilles by the Cypriot clerics and notables who escaped the massacre of July 1821.⁴⁸ The appeal to Capodistrias was repeated less formally in 1830. At the end of the period in 1878, Metropolitan Kyprianos of Kition, in his welcoming address to the first British High Commissioner of Cyprus, declared that the Cypriots saw the British occupation as a purely transitional period that would lead to union with Greece on the precedent of the seven Ionian Islands.⁴⁹

These two declarations of the aspiration for union that marked both ends of the last phase of Ottoman rule point to the processes that gave birth to Greek Cypriot irredentism. Its manifestations in this period cannot be considered to represent a fully-fledged nationalist movement. It would be more accurate to talk of a generally conceived national orientation of Greek Cypriot elites. Gradually this political predilection acquired a more specific ideological content while its social bases were slowly but steadily extended as time went by. Greek Cypriot nationalism as a mass movement was a phenomenon of the British period in the history of Cyprus. The last decades of Ottoman rule, however, witnessed the first manifestations of its increasing appeal among the country's population. This appeal was strengthened as the mechanisms of its operation were gradually shaped and consolidated.

As we have seen, the first indications of self-awareness can be traced to the 1820s with the appeals to Capodistrias. Gradually the manifestations of national sentiment multiplied and the appeal of the "Hellenic Idea" widened. Already in 1829 the first ship flying the flag of the new Greek state, which reached Larnaca harbor, provoked an enthusiastic popular welcome.⁵⁰ In 1846 the establishment of the first Greek Vice-Consulate was greeted with such enthusiasm by the population of Larnaca that Prime Minister Ioannes Kolettis felt obliged to recommend self-

⁴⁷ See E. Protosaltis, 'Η Κύπρος εις τόν Ἀγῶνα τοῦ 1921 [Cyprus in the Struggle of 1821], Athens, 1971, pp. 91-108.

⁴⁸ See Ieronymos Peristianis, Γενική Ἱστορία τῆς Νήσου Κύπρου [A General History of the Island of Cyprus], Nicosia, 1910, pp. 779-82.

⁴⁹ Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1952, Vol. IV, pp. 297-98. Note footnote 8, *loc. cit.*, on the conflicting views concerning whether the aspiration of *enosis* on the Ionian precedent was voiced by Kyprianos of Kition or the Archbishop Sophronios.

⁵⁰ Sylvain Beraud, "Données historiques sur la colonie européenne de Larnaca au XIXème siècle", Πρακτικά τοῦ Πρώτου Διεθνοῦς Κυπριολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου [Proceedings of the First International Congress of Cypriot Studies], Nicosia, 1973, Vol. III, part 1, p. 40.

restraint.⁵¹ Fund-raising activities went on in 1848 for the benefit of the University of Athens—the major center transmitting Hellenic culture and nationalist ideals to the Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Near East.⁵² A few years later the Crimean War stirred up emotions in the cities of Cyprus. In 1854 a leaflet—written by the headmaster of the Greek high school in Nicosia—was secretly circulated. It propagated the Russian cause, and incited the population to revolt in the name of the national idea. These activities, which could have provoked violent Turkish reactions, caused great concern to the Ottoman authorities and to Archbishop Cyril I.⁵³ In 1876 a committee was formed to raise funds for the Greek navy.⁵⁴ These indications, which have been selected from among many others, bear out the evidence of a British Consular Report which in 1866 pointed out that “the townspeople had become inculcated by the Hellenic Idea.”⁵⁵ This testimony is important because it suggests that the original national orientation of the prelates and the notables was already on the way to finding its mass basis among the urban population in the mid-nineteenth century. Additional contemporary evidence concerning the total absence of all political awareness and agitation among the rural population⁵⁶ is very useful in one’s attempt to delimit the extent of the incorporation of the Cypriot population into the emerging nationalist movement.

The ideology that inspired this movement was, as we have seen, the irredentist nationalism of the Great Idea, which from the 1840s onward dominated Greek political thought. This ideology was gradually transmitted from the political elite and the intelligentsia of Athens to the major centers of Hellenism outside Greece and to the Greek periphery in the East. The mechanisms of transmission of this ideology from the political center to the periphery of Hellenism have not been examined in any adequate way. The subject is nevertheless central for an understanding of the sociology of modern Greek nationalism. Relevant research will throw light on the ways in which isolated traditional populations on the Greek periphery⁵⁷ were socialized and gradually incorporated

⁵¹ Eleni Bellia, “Ελληνικά Προξενεία εις τήν Τουρκοκρατούμενην Κύπρον, 1834-1878” [Greek Consulates in Turkish-held Cyprus, 1834-1878] *ibid.*, p. 246.

⁵² N. Kyriazis, “Ἡ παιδεία ἐν Λάρνακι” [Education in Larnaca], *Κυπριακά Χρονικά*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (1929), pp. 289-93.

⁵³ Hill, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, pp. 194-99.

⁵⁴ Bellia, “Ελληνικά Προξενεία,” p. 255.

⁵⁵ Vice Consul Sandwith, F.O. 329/1, 29 October 1866, quoted in Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, p. 496.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 231. See also Sir Harry Luke, *Cyprus under the Turks*, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1921, pp. 209-210, quoting a report of British Vice Consul Horace P. White for the year 1862. As late as 1902 the peasantry was reported in Colonial Office documents as unaffected by political agitation. See P.R.O./C.O. 883/6, August 30, 1902.

⁵⁷ Cf. a fascinating study of the process in another isolated region of the Greek East, in Anthony Bryer, “The Pontic Revival and the New Greece” in

into a political movement that primarily served the needs of the political class dominating the kingdom of Greece.

The foremost exponent of the spirit of Greek irredentist nationalism in Cyprus progressively became the Greek Orthodox Church. Although all available evidence suggests that during the last phase of Ottoman rule the Archbishops and bishops of Cyprus maintained good relations and engaged in close cooperation with the local Ottoman authorities,⁵⁸ they never failed at the same time to foster the ideals and voice the aspirations of Greek nationalism in Cyprus. Their espousal of this ideology naturally turned it into an integral part of the prevailing orthodoxy of beliefs and values in the eyes and conscience of their flock. Through the educational system which was maintained and controlled by the Church, the nationalist ideology became the main value system into which younger generations were systematically socialized. The expansion of the network of primary and secondary schools first in the cities and later in the countryside, already on its way in the 1860s, opened up new audiences for Hellenic nationalistic values.⁵⁹ The growth of literacy, therefore, can at the same time be seen as an indicator of the spread of nationalist ideology, which, in this way, found a mass basis.

These local mechanisms were sustained and reinforced by the activities of other exponents of Greek nationalism who were gradually making their way into Cyprus from the major centers of nineteenth century Hellenism. In the years immediately following the Greek War of Independence, the Greek Cypriots who participated in it and were accorded Greek citizenship returned to their native island.⁶⁰ They gravitated around the Greek consular authorities established in Cypriot cities⁶¹ and turned into propagandists of Greek nationalism. A similar spirit was espoused by Cypriot pupils who were sent to attend high school in the Greek kingdom (Nauplion, Athens, Ermoupolis) from the 1830s to the 1860s. To these were soon added university students. The Greek vice-consul reported proudly in 1856 that, due to his systematic encouragement, the numbers of Cypriot students attending the University of Athens was

N. P. Diamandouros, et. al., eds., *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change*, Thessaloniki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1976, pp. 171-190.

⁵⁸ Costas P. Kyrris, "Symbiotic Elements in the History of the two Communities of Cyprus" *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Political Geography*, Nicosia, 1976, pp. 148-149 and my "'Από τή δράση τοῦ Ἀρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου Παναρέτου" [From the activity of Archbishop Panaretos of Cyprus], *Κυπριακά Σπουδαί*, Vol. XXXVI (1972), pp. 54-57.

⁵⁹ Loizos Philippou, "Τά Ἑλληνικά Γράμματα ἐν Κύπρῳ κατά τήν περίοδον τῆς Τουρκοκρατίας" [Greek Letters in Cyprus during the period of Turkish rule], Nicosia, 1930, Vol. I, pp. 175-76 and 189 ff.

⁶⁰ Bellia, "Ἑλληνικά Προξενεῖα εἰς τήν Τουρκοκρατουμένην Κύπρον," pp. 250-51. Also Philippou, *Κύπριοι Ἀγωνισταί*, pp. 132-136.

⁶¹ Bellia, "Ἑλληνικά Προξενεῖα," pp. 245-49.

growing steadily.⁶³ This group of educated Cypriots became the vocal ideological exponents and provided the leadership of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement. It is characteristic that the first two scholarship students who were sent to the Theological School of the University of Athens by Archbishop Makarios I in the 1850s were Sophronios and Kyprianos, who later became Archbishop of Cyprus and Metropolitan of Kition, respectively. In these capacities, both played leading roles in the nationalist movement and both officially formulated the *enosis* aspiration in their greeting addresses to the British High Commissioner on the very first day of British rule.

The efforts of the Cypriots educated in Greece on behalf of the nationalist cause were greatly assisted by the mainland school teachers who staffed Cypriot schools on an ever-increasing scale in the decades before and after the British occupation in 1878.⁶³ Nationalist ideas were kept alive by their teaching and by the Greek newspapers which were channeled by the Greek consulates to the Cypriot public through both these mainland Greek teachers and the Athens-trained Cypriots who maintained contacts with the consular authorities.⁶⁴ During the heyday of Greek irredentist nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, the development of Greek education in the unredeemed Greek territories was closely followed and assisted by organizations specifically formed for this purpose in Athens or in the major Greek centers of the Ottoman Empire. Realizing that education was the most powerful channel for the transmission of the nationalist ideology, organizations such as the Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters (*Σύλλογος πρὸς Διάδοσιν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν Γραμμάτων*) in Athens or the Greek Literary Association of Constantinople (*Ἑλληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*) systematically assisted the expansion and improvement of the educational system of the irredenta. This assistance consisted of direct economic aid, gifts of books and other teaching aids, recruitment and training of teachers, or sending of mainland teachers, usually as headmasters setting educational policy in the unredeemed territories. Despite its distance from the center, Cyprus received all these forms of educational assistance on a varying scale.⁶⁵

⁶³ Historical Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Cyprus/37/12, Doc. No. 39, 14 January 1856.

⁶³ In this connection the following statistic is characteristic: All the headmasters of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, the foremost center of Greek education in Cyprus, between its official recognition by the Greek government in 1893 and 1936, except one, were mainland Greeks, not Cypriots. See Kleonoulos Myrianthopoulos, *Ἡ παιδεία ἐν Κύπρῳ κατὰ τὴν Ἀγγλοκρατίαν, 1878-1946* [Education in Cyprus during the period of British rule, 1878-1946], Limassol, 1946, p. 198.

⁶⁴ C. P. Kyrris, *Ἱστορία τῆς Μέσης Ἐκπαιδευσεως Ἀμμοχώστου* [History of Secondary Education in Famagusta], Nicosia, Lampousa Editions, 1967, pp. 34-35.

⁶⁵ On the ties between the Greek Literary Association of Constantinople and Cyprus, see Ch. Papadopoulos, "Ἀνέκδοτα Ἐγγράφα περι τῶν Σχολείων τῆς Λευκωσίας κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον ἥμισυ τοῦ 10' αἰῶνος" [Unpublished documents on

Concurrently, a "scientific" basis was built to sustain the national aspirations of Greek Cypriot irredentism. Research in history, folklore, and linguistics, inspired by similar scholarly developments in Greece, provided evidence in support of the claims of Hellenism in Cyprus. This scholarly tradition was inaugurated by the publication of the monumental work of A. Sakellarios, *Τά Κυπριακά* (*Cypriot Matters*), a study of the geography, history, language, and civilization of Cyprus. A mainland Greek philologist who was headmaster of the Greek high school in Larnaca (1849-53), Sakellarios extended the tradition of nineteenth century Greek nationalist historicism and folklorism to Cyprus.⁶⁶ From the circle of his pupils emerged the first Cypriot folklore researchers and school teachers.⁶⁷ In the house of one of these in Famagusta, Cypriots gathered to read the Greek newspapers sent there by the Greek consulate in Larnaca.⁶⁸

Thus, the whole network of mechanisms and channels through which the nationalist movement operated in Cyprus took shape. These basic

the schools of Nicosia in the second half of the nineteenth century], *Κυπριακά! Σπουδαί*, Vol. XX (1956), pp. 252-60 and *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII (1959), p. 219. See also Συνέδριον τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν Συλλόγων. Πρακτικά τῆς πρώτης αὐτοῦ συνόδου συγκροτηθείσης ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐν ἔτει 1879 [Congress of Greek Associations. Proceedings of its first meeting held in Athens in the year 1879], Athens, 1879, pp. 238-39. On the activities of the Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters in another part of the irredenta see Eleni Bellia, "Ἡ δραστηριότης τοῦ ἐν Ἀθήναις Συλλόγου πρὸς Διάδοσιν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν Γραμμάτων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ τῆς Θράκης" [The activity of the Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters on behalf of Hellenism in Thrace], *Ἀθηνᾶ*, Vol. 75 (1974-1975), pp. 85-94.

⁶⁶ A. A. Sakellarios, *Τά Κυπριακά: Γεωγραφία, Ἱστορία, Γλῶσσα τῆς Νήσου Κύπρου* [Cypriot Matters: Geography, History, Language of the Island of Cyprus], 1st ed., Vols. I-II, Athens, 1855-1868; 2nd, enlarged ed., Vols. I-II, Athens, 1890-1891. For an appraisal see Th. Papadopoulos, "Ἀθανάσιος Σακελλάριος, 1826-1901" [Athanasios Sakellarios, 1826-1901], *Κυπριακά! Σπουδαί*, Vol. XXXII (1968), pp. 3-8. Other pertinent indications of the intellectual preoccupations of the period included the publication of an ethnological monograph by Ieronymos Myriantheus, *Περὶ τῶν Ἀρχαίων Κυπρίων* [On the Ancient Cypriots], Athens, 1869, which was clearly motivated by nationalist concerns (see especially pp. vii-x) and the participation of Cypriots, deriving their inspiration from the historical past of their island, in the nation-wide poetry competitions sponsored by the University of Athens. See *Κρίσις τοῦ Βουτσιναίου Ποιητικοῦ Διαγωνισμοῦ 1875* [Judgement of the Voutsineos Poetry Competition, 1875], Athens, 1875, pp. 46-48, 61-62. Finally the British occupation motivated the publication of a brief historical essay stressing the Hellenic character of the history of Cyprus by one of the major figures of Greek historical scholarship. See Spyridon Lambros, *Περὶ Κύπρου* [On Cyprus], Athens, 1878.

⁶⁷ Among these the most important was Georgios Louka, author of *Φιλολογικαὶ Ἐπισκέψεις τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τῶν νεωτέρων Κυπρίων μνημείων τῶν ἀρχαίων* [Philological Researches on ancient survivals in the life of modern Cypriots], Athens, 1874. The prolegomena in this edition, pp. v-xiii, constitute one of the most eloquent statements of Cypriot nationalist thinking in the nineteenth century.

⁶⁸ C. P. Kyrris, *Ἱστορία τῆς Μέσης Ἑκπαιδευσεως Ἀμμοχώστου*, *loc. cit.*

mechanisms operated openly and much more freely after the British occupation of 1878, which brought conditions more conducive to the development of a mass nationalist movement in Cyprus.

III. *The Dialectic of Intolerance*

Enough evidence has been presented, I think, to meet the two basic research objectives of this paper: to analyze the ideological content of Greek irredentist nationalism and to establish its transition to Cyprus in the course of the nineteenth century. The subsequent history of Greek nationalism in Cyprus is beyond the concerns of the present paper. I have described elsewhere the development of the nationalist movement, its spread from the cities to the countryside, the incorporation of the peasantry that provided its mass basis, and the social and political struggles that accompanied its growth and intensified its intransigence.⁶⁹ There is only one aspect of this subsequent history that must be noted for our present purposes. It has to do with the ideological functions of nationalism in the politics of Cyprus during the British period. There is no doubt that nationalism, once it developed into a mass movement, genuinely embodied the aspirations of the great majority of the Greek population of Cyprus throughout the period of British rule.⁷⁰ The universal appeal of the aspiration of union with Greece found its expression in the plebiscite of 1950 (in which about 97% of the eligible voters voted for *enosis*) and in the solid support of the populace for the liberation struggle in the 1950s. Yet besides this widespread appeal that provided the mass popular basis of the anticolonial struggle of Cyprus, nationalism as an ideological orthodoxy served other social functions as well. Fundamentally, it was used to uphold the legitimacy of the authority of its exponents (the Church and a segment of the commercial and professional bourgeoisie), who monopolized the leadership of the Greek Cypriots throughout the British period. Challenges to this monopoly of power and ideological orthodoxy coming from modernizing elements in the community and, more specifically, from the organized left invariably precipitated the articulation of the non-liberal temper and intolerance that were ingrained in the irredentist ideology of *enosis*.⁷¹ From this point of view, the im-

⁶⁹ See "From Coexistence to Confrontation: the Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus" in Michael Attalides, ed., *Cyprus Reviewed*, Nicosia, 1977, pp. 35-70.

⁷⁰ Most sources on the Cyprus Question tend to ignore this crucial dimension of the problem. For a corrective see Michael Dendias, *La Question Cypriote aux points de vue historique et de droit international*, Paris, Sirey, 1934, pp. 36-167. It criticizes on precisely this count the otherwise remarkable work by Captain C. W. Orr, *Cyprus under British Rule*, London, 1918.

⁷¹ For a fuller analysis see Kyriacos C. Markides, "Social Change and the rise and decline of social movements: The case of Cyprus," *American Ethnologist*, Vol. I, No. 2 (May, 1974), pp. 309-330.

pact of *enosis* on the workings of Greek Cypriot domestic politics was the same as that of the Great Idea within Greece: it precluded the emergence of a liberal political culture. British colonial practice, which tended to preserve and politicize traditional corporate structures as the agents of representation of the peoples of the colonies, further undermined the prospects of liberalism while, at the same time, planting the seeds of future ethnic conflict.⁷² The intolerance of Greek nationalism was not limited to its leftist Greek challengers. It was extended to all British proposals for constitutional change put forward in the 1940s when the pressures of decolonization were felt in Cyprus.⁷³ Previous British repression and manipulation, however, following the abortive rebellion of 1931, constituted one of the most decisive factors in building up this intransigence, which eventually collided headlong with Turkish Cypriot nationalist claims.

Thus, although the British regime introduced modern Western civilization and its liberal values to Cyprus and was distinguished, especially during its first fifty years, by the practice of a wide range of civil liberties and a remarkable degree of political toleration, its eventual political legacy essentially amounted to an institutionalization of a dialectic of intolerance as the major characteristic of local political culture. This was the fundamental paradox of a liberal regime that nurtured an extremely intolerant and illiberal temper in local politics as a consequence of its policies toward the national aspirations of the subject people and toward the organization of ethnic relations in a binational society.

At this point some consideration should be given to the nature of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, which developed belatedly in Cyprus as a by-product of three interlocking pressures: British manipulation, reactions to the *enosis* movement, and mainland Turkish influence.

British rule in Cyprus prevented the reforms of Atatürkism from being enforced on Turkish Cypriots. As a consequence, their sense of ethnic identity, which matured gradually as a reaction to the growth of Greek Cypriot nationalism, remained fundamentally based on Islam.⁷⁴ In the 1930s one can witness the signs of an emerging nationalist movement among Turkish-Cypriots—a full century after the first Greek nationalist stirring on the island. Such symptoms included the gradual espousal of Atatürk's reforms after his regime was firmly established in Turkey and the first attempts to argue the Turkish Cypriot cause on an intellectual level by means of two books dealing with the condition of the community and the Ottoman past of Cyprus.⁷⁵ The modernizing re-

⁷² See "From Coexistence to Confrontation" for more detailed elaboration.

⁷³ Developments in the crucial decades of the 1940s and 1950s are covered in detail in François Crouzet, *Le Conflit de Chypre*, Brussels, Bruylant, 1973, 2 vols.

⁷⁴ Charles F. Beckingham, "Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus," *Die Welt des Islams*, N.S., Vol. V, 1957, pp. 65-83.

⁷⁵ Ismet Konur, *Kıbrıs Türkleri* [The Turks of Cyprus], Nicosia, 1938, and Halil Alasya, *Kıbrıs Tarihi* [History of Cyprus], Nicosia, 1939.

forms of Atatürkism were easier to accept in Cyprus than in Turkey because the ground had been prepared by the British administration and the changes it brought. At the same time, since these reforms were never enforced from above, the spirit of secular, modernizing, forward-looking Atatürkism that animated the early years of the Turkish Republic was not implanted in Cyprus. The significance of this lay in the fact that when other kinds of nationalist influences began emanating from Turkey to Cyprus they found no ideological counterweight. Indeed, when Turkish Cypriot nationalism adopted a more self-conscious attitude and took a separatist turn in the 1940s,⁷⁶ its ideological needs were met by a new system of nationalist beliefs and values ascendant in Turkey in the postwar years.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, precisely at the time that the Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement was taking shape, more and more of the progressive tenets of Atatürkism were subjected to questioning. This was the result of the liberalization of Turkish politics and the transition to a multiparty system that gave an opportunity to right-wing dissenters to voice their reservations concerning Atatürkism.⁷⁷ The change in the ideological content of Turkish nationalism after 1945 was reflected in the gradual reemergence of Islam as an element in the Turkish national identity, both on the popular and intellectual level—at the expense of the secular emphasis of Atatürkism.⁷⁸ By losing its secular character, Turkish nationalism became an outlet for the expression and defense of religious ideas. Along with the Islamic revival went elements of a resurrected Pan-Turkism and racism (nurtured already by Nazi propaganda in the 1930s and during World War II).⁷⁹ The danger posed by the Islamic revival and Pan-Turkism to the very foundation of the Turkish Republic became increasingly apparent with the critical view of Western culture and republican reforms that went with them. This reasserted conservatism was directed more against the ideological rather than the practical side of Atatürkism: secularism was questioned, for instance, but not the legal or economic changes embodied in Atatürk's program.⁸⁰ The attitude of anti-intellectualism and distrust of reason that all this gave rise to, increasingly apparent in the 1950s, undermined the prospects of Turkish

⁷⁶ See Michael Attalides, "The Turkish Cypriots: their relations to the Greek Cypriots in perspective," *Cyprus Reviewed*, pp. 71-97. *Idem*, *Cyprus Nationalism and International Politics*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979 is germane to an understanding of these problems.

⁷⁷ For a detailed study of the political and intellectual history of this period see Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-party System*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.

⁷⁸ *Inter alia* see Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey," *International Affairs*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1 (January, 1952), pp. 38-48 and H. A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (Summer 1954), pp. 267-282.

⁷⁹ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 262-270.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 344-348.

liberalism and prepared the ground for the emergence of several currents of extremism in the 1960s.⁸¹ As a consequence, the major cultural problem of Turkey has remained the absence of a liberal atmosphere which could sustain free thought and criticism. In this context, Turkish nationalism became an exclusive political and cultural dogma which blocked a tolerant outlook from developing.⁸²

Such beliefs and values perfectly suited the needs of the extremists who were consolidating their control over the Turkish-Cypriots in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the secret organizations that were promoting the designs for the partition of Cyprus—on which the British and Turkish governments colluded in order to block the liberation struggle of the Greek Cypriots—were directly linked, and continue to be to this day, to the most reactionary and militant elements in the conservative revival in Turkey.⁸³

The Turkish Cypriot contribution to the ideological content of this nationalism was to help make explicit its latent anti-Greek strain. Anti-Greek resentment was an important component of Turkish nationalism, springing from the fact that Republican Turkey fought its war of independence against the Greek armies that landed in Asia Minor in the wake of World War I in pursuit of the Great Idea.⁸⁴ Suppressed under Atatürk's policy of conciliation with Greece, the anti-Greek bias surfaced again in the policies associated with the capital tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) imposed mostly on non-Turkish minorities during the Second World War.⁸⁵ In the context of Islamic revival and reemerging Pan-Turkish trends, anti-Greek sentiment, loaded with heavy historical memories of Greco-Turkish conflict, was easily resurrected in response to Greek nationalist militancy.

This kind of ideology was juxtaposed to Greek nationalism in Cyprus at a time when the latter was reaching the height of its own militant intolerance and non-liberal orientation. Curiously enough, this was hap-

⁸¹ Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Leiden, Brill, 1974, pp. 171-242.

⁸² Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 259-260.

⁸³ For the consolidation of extremist control over the Turkish Cypriot community and the elimination of all opposition to militant right-wing leadership, see Attalides, *Cyprus*, pp. 47-49, 55-56. Concurrently active interest and involvement in the Cyprus problem has always come from the most militant elements in Turkish conservatism and chauvinism. See for instance Landau, *Radical Politics in Turkey*, pp. 201, 222-23, 235. For a survey of the views of Turkish political parties on Cyprus and other foreign relations issues, see Ferenc Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 99-114.

⁸⁴ See for instance Halide Edib Adivar, *Turkey Faces West, A Turkish View of Recent Changes and Their Origin*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930, pp. 57-61, 146-151, 169-170, 176-178, 187-188.

⁸⁵ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp.297-301.

pening concurrently with the escalation of the liberation struggle and the outbreak of the anticolonial revolt in the 1950s. The intensification of liberation efforts and increasing claims of self-determination were, to a great extent, the outcome of domestic political and social conflicts between left and right in Cyprus. The traditional right, gravely concerned over the great strides made by the left in the 1940s, found the intensification of nationalist claims an effective way to outbid their opponents and reassert their predominance in the leadership of the community.⁸⁶ Thus, Greek Cypriot nationalism combined its adamant claims for *enosis* with an increasingly militant anti-leftist bias. The monopolization of the leadership of the liberation struggle by the nationalist right and the total exclusion of the left from it—partly the result of the left's own mistakes and misjudgments⁸⁷—deprived the anticolonial movement of any kind of progressive social content. No aspirations for social change were voiced by official Greek Cypriot nationalist doctrine. The void was filled by the ethnic mystique of Hellenic idealism, which captured the noble dreams of many young men who sacrificed their lives for freedom and "mother Hellas." Regardless of the implications of the belief systems that went into the making of Greek Cypriot nationalist ideology, tribute should be paid to the youthful freedom fighters who, through their supreme sacrifice, individually attained a moral greatness which was obscured by certain inherent contradictions in the case of their movement. These contradictions become much clearer when one moves from a purely domestic examination to a consideration of the Cypriot anticolonial movement on an international level.

While domestic social conflicts were pushing Greek Cypriot nationalism to increasingly atavistic and reactionary positions, its claim of self-determination placed it, internationally, on the side of other anticolonial movements led by left-wing nationalists for whom self-determination meant not only termination of foreign rule but also radical social change. The contradiction was hopelessly complicated by the substantive claim of the liberation struggle, incorporation into Greece, a NATO country over which an alliance of conservative forces was tightening its grip during that period. The consequences of these contradictions were twofold: internationally, the Cypriot liberation struggle could not muster the unconditional support of its natural allies, the nations of the emerging third world;⁸⁸ domestically, the absence of a progressive social content and the emphasis on *enosis* precluded an alliance with the progressive

⁸⁶ Crouzet, *Le Conflict de Chypre*, Vol. I, pp. 95-177.

⁸⁷ On this point see Demokritos [George Cacoyiannis], *Ἡ Ἀπελευθερωτική ἡγεσία καὶ ὁ ἔθνοπλος ἀγῶνας—Μαρξιστικὴ Κριτικὴ* [The leadership of AKEL and the armed struggle—a Marxist Critique], Cyprus, 1959.

⁸⁸ See Stephen G. Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1957*, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1967, pp. 40-41, 53-55, 326, 380-81, 468-73 for the reservations voiced at the United Nations by Third World leaders concerning the *Enosis* claim.

elements of the Turkish Cypriot community, which might have sought, by means of such an inter-ethnic anticolonial alignment, to emancipate their own community from the grip of its right-wing extremists. Such a turn of events might have provided the only sound basis for an "integrative revolution"⁸⁹ once the Republic of Cyprus came into being.

Unfortunately, the nationalist legacy of each community led in the opposite direction. Out of the configuration of two opposed conservative and authoritarian nationalisms, symbolically antagonistic and mutually exclusive, developed the dialectic of intolerance that provided the ideological content of ethnic conflict. On the eve of its independence, Cyprus experienced the crystallization of this dialectic of intolerance, which stretched from the ideological to most other levels of public life. In this ideology, the bicomunal experiment of the Republic of Cyprus—seriously handicapped from its inception by institutionalized foreign interference—had to face still another subversive force.

The dialectic of intolerance was so deeply entrenched in the political culture of independent Cyprus that all timid voices raised against it in the cause of the survival of the Republic were simply stamped out. On the Greek side, the dominant ideological orthodoxy, thriving on the absence of a liberal political culture, was ruthless in discrediting as national betrayals all voices of heretical criticism. On the Turkish side, the extremists, firmly rooted in the leadership of the community, did not limit themselves to moral and psychological coercion, but went all the way in using their underground terrorist gangs to achieve the physical liquidation of dissenting critics. It was precisely this dialectic of intolerance that accompanied the escalation of ethnic conflict, the separation of the communities, and the intensification of foreign intervention that nurtured and strengthened the most reactionary elements on both sides and reached its culmination in the tragedy of 1974. The dialectic of intolerance eventually nurtured the ideologies of national catastrophe.

Tragic as this story certainly is as an account of the ideological legitimization of a vicious spiral of deepening social and political conflict contributing to the bloody dénouement acted out in the summer of 1974, it does provide an almost classic illustration of the role of ideological factors in historical change. In the framework of a concrete case study of the development of two nationalist ideologies and their eventual collision in ethnic conflict, it appears possible to assess realistically both the impact of specifically ideological factors on political change and also to illustrate concretely the uses to which ideology, in Mannheim's conception, can be put in the course of social struggles. The insights that can be thus gained into this most controversial of all dialectical relations in social theory, that between ideas and social change, point

⁸⁹ In the sense suggested by Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States*, New York, Free Press, 1963, pp. 109-114.

to the broader theoretical relevance of similar explorations focusing on the ideological dimensions of ethnic conflicts and the historical role of nationalism. As far as the particular case study anatomized here is concerned, the historical analysis of its ideological and intellectual aspects suggests how much can be gained, in terms of in-depth understanding, by looking at the internal dimensions of a problem which has been to such an extent obscured by its engulfment in international power politics. These are simply some hints at the theoretical and methodological conclusions that emerge from the foregoing analysis, but there is an important substantive issue as well that should be underlined as an appropriate closing reflection. The experience of living through a tragedy or reliving it even on the level of intellectual discourse is, of course, painful, but awareness of its inner dialectic can and ought to be cathartic for those with more than a mere academic interest in the facts recounted here. Catharsis can be best achieved in the shape of self-criticism and reappraisal of the presuppositions of collective moral and political consciousness. In this way, out of the experience of tragedy, the temper of critical thinking that was lost with the failure of the Enlightenment might be regained.

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